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I. Introduction:  
 
 The modern Olympic Games, first held in 1896, began as an effort to emulate the ancient 
Olympic Games of Greece that were held from 776 B.C. to 393 A.D. Occurring every two years, 
alternating between the Winter and Summer Olympics respectively, the purpose of this 
international competition is “to bring together sport, culture and education for the betterment of 
human beings” (The Olympic Museum, 2007). This is further emphasized by the Olympic creed 
that states, “The most important thing in life is not the triumph, but the fight; the essential thing 
is not to have won, but to have fought well,” stressing the importance of success in terms of 
effort as opposed to victory (The Olympic Museum, 2007).  
 The Olympic Movement consists of international sports federations (IFs), National 
Olympic Committees (NOCs), and organizing committees for each specific Olympic Games. In 
the US, the NOC operates under the title of the United States Olympic Committee (USOC) and 
acts as the coordinating body of all Olympic-related activity in the United States. This involves 
providing funds, training facilities, and support staff for athletes representing the US in the 
Olympic Games. The mission statement of the USOC is “to support U.S. and Paralympic athletes 
in achieving sustained competitive excellence and preserve the Olympic ideals, and thereby 
inspiring all Americans” (United States Olympic Committee, 2009).  
 The USOC operates as a non-profit organization, falling under the tax-exempt Internal 
Revenue Code 501(c)(3) as an organization that fosters national or international amateur sports 
competition (IRS, 2008). In 1978, the US Congress passed the Amateur Sports Act, chartering 
the USOC as the sole entity responsible for coordinating all Olympic-related activity in the US. 





“Olympiad,” and “Citius Altius Fortius,”1 in addition to the use of any Olympic-related symbols 
in the United States (United States Olympic Committee, 2009). Thus, the United States Olympic 
Committee acts as a monopolist of all Olympic-affiliated activity in the United States.   
 Moreover, while the ideals of the Olympic Movement emphasize the importance of 
participation rather than winning, past Olympic Games show the success of a nation’s team in 
terms of its gold medal count take precedence over the founding ideals of the competition (Ging, 
Hoffmann and Ramasmay, 2002). As a result, the desired outcome emphasized by the USOC 
does not necessarily adhere to the stated mission of the founding Olympic ideals. In fact, such a 
strong emphasis on winning closely resembles the actions set forth by many for-profit sporting 
firms. This being said, in combination with the USOC’s monopolist control over Olympic 
activity in the US, the question is raised as to why the USOC operates as a non-profit 
organization. While many papers have sought to discover the specific economic factors that 
affect the success of the United States Olympic Committee and other NOCs, there has been little 
research conducted as to why the USOC operates as a non-profit organization. This paper seeks 
to examine this question.  In the following section of this paper, the economics behind the United 
States Olympic Committee are evaluated and a theory about the operation of the organization is 
developed. Next, this theory is analyzed and discussed. Lastly, I conclude.  
 
II. The Economics of the USOC 
 As its mission statement declares, the purpose of the United States Olympic Committee is 
to assist US athletes in achieving competitive excellence in the Olympic Games. This indirectly 
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implies that the USOC wishes to maximize gold medal counts for US athletes and that Olympic 
success is a measure of the number of gold medals won at the Games.  
 When the United States Olympic Committee pursues its mission statement so that 
American Olympic athletes win gold medals, the organization is a producer of positive 
externalities, for the celebration of Olympic success (gold medal attainment) is a pure public 
good. Olympic success is both non-rival and non-excludable in that “one’s consumption does not 
reduce the consumption of others and all can consume Olympic success at the level of its total 
supply” (Groot, 2008, p.3). American citizens will “talk about their team, cheer for its success, 
and celebrate its victories and may do so without buying tickets or making any payment to the 
team” (Johnson, 2001, p. 7). As the US wins more gold medals, it is likely that more and more 
citizens will take an interest in the success of US Olympic teams and feelings of American pride 
will increase, creating increased amounts of public goods.
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 Additionally, as gold medal counts increase, the utility of American citizens will increase 
as they benefit more and more from the public goods fostered by Olympic success. This 
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 It is important to note that the public goods qualities of Olympic success is of limited benefit, 
for not all US citizens take an interest in the Olympics or derive positive feelings from the 







 As the number of gold medals captured by US athletes climbs from wL to wH, the utility 
felt by American citizens increases from U(wL) to U(wH). This movement along the utility 
curve makes them better off as the gold medal count rises for the United States. 
 The increase in utility experienced by American citizens who value the success of the US 
in the Olympic Games can have a very powerful effect. The rise in utility acts as a signal to 
private firms that associating with the United States Olympic Committee could produce private 
benefits for their own businesses. This is due to a reputational halo effect: US citizens who take 
interest in the Olympic Games may see the name of a firm that is tied to the USOC, create a 
positive association with the firm, and thus purchase a good or service from that firm in the 
future (Hurley and Wally, 1998). Thus, by becoming a corporate sponsor of the United States 
Olympic Committee, firms are likely to benefit from an increase in revenue caused by the 
positive association in the eyes of the public.  Consequently, many firms are willing to spend 





larger amounts of utility associated with American Olympic success, therefore heavily 
influencing the revenue of the organization. 
 Currently, the United States Olympic Committee earns revenue from six main sources: 
Broadcast Rights Income, USOC Marks Rights Income, Licensing Royalty Income, 
Contributions, Grants from the United States Olympic Foundation, and Investment Income 
(United States Olympic Commitee, 2009). The following graph displays the percentage of 






















Source: United States Olympic Committee Annual Report (2009) 
 
  As indicated on the graph, over 70 per cent of the USOC’s revenue comes from sources 
related to corporate sponsorship that pay to be associated with the organization. These sources 
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 These percentages are based on the average revenues from each source between 2006 and 2009 
and include both Winter and Summer Olympic years (Torino Winter Olympics in 2006 and 





include Broadcast Rights Income (27.4%), USOC Marks Rights Income (39.8%), and Licensing 
Royalty Income (3.24%). Based on a four-year average, over $133 million of roughly $190 
million the USOC experienced in revenue came from these sources. 
 Because the United States Olympic Committee has a monopoly over the Olympic 
industry in the US, they are able to act as price discriminators when setting the price for the right 
for a firm to associate themselves with the organization. I theorize that the USOC only benefits 
from these associations if the revenue generated from the partnership is enough to increase its 
marginal output of another gold medal win for an American athlete or team. Therefore, there is a 
minimum price the organization is willing to accept in order to offer its partnership with a firm. 
The following graph depicts the demand curve for firms seeking partnerships with the United 







 The demand curve is downward sloping because as the price the USOC is willing to 
accept falls, more firms are willing to pay for the partnership. Because the USOC has the market 
power to set a different price for every bidder and demand is downward sloping, the marginal 
revenue curve falls below the demand curve. Price pH represents the maximum price a firm is 
willing to spend in order to gain an association with the United States Olympic Committee.  
 Real GDP is the best single predictor of a country’s Olympic performance because 
countries with higher real GDP are more likely to channel significant funds towards its NOC as 
to encourage Olympic success (Bernard and Busse, 2004; Ging, Hoffmann and Ramasamy, 
2002). The United States has the highest real GDP in the world (World Bank, 2010). Therefore, 
funds collected by the United States Olympic Committee have a direct effect on its mission: the 
more revenue the USOC has, the better able the organization is to support American athletes in 
achieving Olympic success by producing gold medals. Because revenue from corporate 
affiliations makes up the largest portion of the USOC’s total revenue, it is assumed that these 
sources are the largest contributor to US Olympic success.
 4
 The graph below exhibits the 
optimal level of output the USOC produces as a price discriminating monopolist based upon 
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 Though an increase in utility of American citizens may cause an increase in contributions by 
citizens to the USOC, average annual revenue generated from this source only accounts for 
roughly 17% of the organization’s total revenue. Therefore, it is assumed that these contributions 







 As the graph illustrates, the USOC will invest in the Olympic success of American 
athletes up until the point where average revenue (AR, also equal to the demand for gold medals) 
from an additional gold medal is equal to the organization’s average total cost (ATC), producing 
Q* gold medals. This is also where the marginal revenue curve (MR) hits the x-axis, showing 
that further output of gold medals for the US would produce negative returns. Therefore, the 
United States Olympic Committee would only accept bids for corporate sponsorship up to the 
point where Q* gold medals are produced. Because the organization is a non-profit, it seems 
logical that the USOC would be willing to accept these sources of revenue infinitely as to 









 Moreover, the shaded area on Figure 4 (page 9) represents the economic surplus earned 
by the USOC when the organization is producing the optimal level of gold medals. This 
economic surplus appears to be quite large. Since the United States Olympic Committee is a non-
profit organization, they must adhere to the non-distribution constraint and use any economic 
surplus to support the mission of the organization: to produce gold medals for the US at the 
Olympic Games. But, as output level Q* signifies, the organization is already producing the 
optimal number of gold medals, again suggesting that the United States Olympic Committee may 
be better suited as a for-profit organization. The following section lends evidence to this theory. 
 
III. The USOC as a For-Profit Organization 
 A for-profit operation of the United States Olympic Committee would be beneficial for 
many reasons. The organization would have the freedom to distribute its economic surplus as it 
pleases, likely to satisfy many employees and athletes of the organization through increased 
income. Additionally, it would be both favorable to American taxpayers. As a 501(c)(3) non-
profit organization, the United States Olympic Committee receives many tax incentives that are 
often at the expense of US citizens. As a for-profit organization, the USOC would be responsible 
for paying taxes, which would minimize the economic tolls placed on the American public for 
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 This may help to explain why Contributions make up only 17% of the USOC’s total revenue. 
Corporations may only be willing to contribute to the USOC in exchange for an official 
partnership, thus explaining the significance of partnership revenue in the production of gold 





the operation of the United States Olympic Committee.
6
 Therefore, both the USOC and 
American citizens privately benefit from a for-profit status.  
 Not only would the operation of the United States Olympic Committee as a for-profit 
organization be beneficial, but it is also very plausible. In fact, the USOC already shares some 
significant similarities with the idiosyncratic operation of many for-profit sporting organizations. 
Parallel to the goals of the United States Olympic Committee, many for-profit sporting 
organizations operate using a similar win-maximizing model. As microeconomic theory 
suggests, for-profit firms should operate as to maximize profits. But Andrew Zimbalist (2003) 
argues that many owners and investors in the for-profit sporting industry are not typical 
businessmen. Profits are not their primary drive, which sharply juxtaposes sports economics with 
for-profit economic models. This changes the structure of a team or club’s optimal level of 
output, which, in terms sports economics, is most commonly seen as the number of wins. If club 
owners are profit maximizers, then they will invest in team success up to the point where the 
expected marginal revenue from an additional win is equal to the marginal cost. If, on the other 
hand, club owners wish to maximize wins, then they are likely to invest beyond this point 
(Zimbalist, 2003). As Figure 4 on page 9 illustrates, the United States Olympic Committee 
operates using a comparable approach, showing that the organization does not need to operate 
using a profit-maximizing model in order to survive in the for-profit sector.  
 This fact is further outlined by the economic history of many sporting franchises. For-
profit sports franchises can often reap substantial capital gains even if they are not operating as 
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 Though as a for-profit organization the USOC would no longer be entitled to tax incentives 
associated with a 501(c)(3) non-profit status, governments often subsidize the building of arenas 
and stadiums for many for-profit sports organizations. In 2001, it was estimated that government 
sources would account for two-thirds of the $21.7 billion spent on the building and renovation of 
major league sports stadiums and arenas (Groothuis, Johnson and Whitehead, 2001, p. 5). Thus, 





profit-maximizers. As estimated by Rodney Fort (2002), during the 1990s, the MLB had an 
average annual rate of franchise appreciation equal to 11.3 per cent, while the rate for the NBA 
was equal 17.7 per cent, 10.7 per cent for the NHL and 12.7 per cent for the NFL. The capital 
gains from sporting franchise appreciation allow for increased profits, offsetting the losses 
associated to the win-maximization model.  
 Even before obtaining capital gains, owners of for-profit sports teams or clubs are often 
willing to operate using win-maximization in order to receive the positive externalities that are 
created upon the win of their team. Psychological reasons such as the want for status, the 
propensity to group identification and the feeling of loyalty that are produced upon the success of 
a team are what drive owner investment (Sloane, 1971, p. 134). Upon interviewing owners and 
executives of US baseball clubs, Jesse Markham and Paul Teplitz concluded that owners “were 
motivated to enter the baseball industry more out of reason of personal gratification, love of the 
game, devotion to professional sports generally, or out of civic pride than by the prospects of 
profits” (1981, p. 26). Walter A. Haas, Jr., the owner of the Oakland Athletics baseball club from 
1980 to 1995, is an excellent example of this type of owner. He regarded professional baseball 
ownership “as a kind of public trust” and “was willing to lose millions to field a competitive 
team that would do Oakland proud,” acting more like a philanthropist than a businessman 
(Zimbalist, 2003, p. 505).  
 These cases exemplify the mission statement of the United States Olympic Committee, as 
the organization functions in order to inspire Americans through the success of American 
Olympic participants. As for-profit sports owners invest in order to seek pride and pleasure from 
the wins of their teams, the USOC wishes to create these feelings for the American population. 





the public goods created in the for-profit sports industry can be a catalyst for an increase in 
utility for their fans. This rise in utility has the same signaling effect as with the USOC, creating 
revenue for the sporting organization in terms of increased sponsorship.
7
 Corporate sponsors of 
the USOC are likely to associate themselves with the organization regardless of its non-profit 
status, which is very significant seeing as though the USOC receives a majority of its funds from 
sources related to corporate sponsorship. Sponsors and affiliates of sporting organizations (both 
for- and non-profit) mainly seek private benefits through their associations with a sports 
organization. This is because corporate sponsors of sport are often able to reach their target 
markets in a more direct and cost-efficient way than traditional forms of mass advertising 
(Copeland and Frisby, 1996). Also, “the image of products, services, or brands can be enhanced 
when a company aligns itself with the positive characteristics of a sport event or successful sport 
athletes” (Copeland and Frisby, 1996, p. 33). Therefore, the incentives for associating with the 
United States Olympic Committee would be present regardless of its non-profit status.   
 
IV. Conclusion 
 In this paper, it was discovered that the operation of the United States Olympic 
Committee is very atypical to what is expected from a non-profit organization. As a non-profit 
that earns a majority of its revenue from corporate affiliations, it would be expected that the 
USOC would be willing to offer its official partnership with any corporation as a way to increase 
the organization’s funding and further invest in the success of American athletes at the Olympic 
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 An increase in utility in the for-profit sports sector may also cause a growth in future ticket 
sales for sporting events. If the USOC were to be for-profit, a rise in utility of fans is less likely 
to produce an increase in ticket sales because of the nature of the Olympics. The Olympic Games 
are an international event that does not always take place in the United States, making it difficult 






Games. But because the United States Olympic Committee has a monopoly on the Olympic 
industry in the United States, it is not willing to accept all bids for corporate sponsorship, 
suggesting that the United States Olympic Committee is better suited as a for-profit organization 
more so than a non-profit. If the USOC were to function as a for-profit, this paper suggests that 
the organization would reap significant financial benefits, as well as produce benefits to the 
American public. These benefits can be seen upon the comparison of the USOC to many for-
profit sports organizations, for the USOC already shares many parallels with the distinctive 
operation of for-profit sporting organizations.  
 Based on research of the for-profit sports industry in the United States, this paper 
theorizes that the United States Olympic Committee would still receive revenue from corporate 
affiliations regardless of its non-profit status. Future research should empirically investigate the 
significance of non-profit status of a sporting organization as a determinant of the organization’s 
success. Using non-profit status as an explanatory variable would offer evidence as to the degree 
to which the non-profit status of the USOC affects its revenue and, in turn, its production of gold 
medals for American Olympic athletes. If the variable is insignificant, this further supports the 
theory present in this thesis that the United States Olympic Committee can and should function 
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